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“WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED”: HOW 
FLORIDA’S VENUE STATUTE VIOLATES THE POLICY IT WAS 
DESIGNED TO PROTECT 
Kristin Nelson Royal* 
Abstract 
Venue is the “proper or a possible place for a lawsuit to proceed,” and 
its purpose is to ensure all possible fairness and convenience for parties 
to litigation, especially the defendant. Florida Statute § 47.011 provides 
three places where venue may be proper: the county where the defendant 
resides, the county where the cause of action accrued, and the county 
where the property in litigation is located. Although determining where a 
defendant lives or where property is located is fairly simple, determining 
where a cause of action accrued can prove more difficult. In an action for 
tort, courts have indicated that the cause of action accrues where the tort 
is complete. Florida courts have created two competing tests to determine 
where torts are complete: the “effects test” and the “overt acts test.” While 
the effects test is proper according to the correct interpretation of the 
accrual provision of § 47.011, it may violate policy by laying proper 
venue in counties where defendants have no connection, thus 
disadvantaging them. In contrast, the overt acts test advances the policy 
behind venue by producing results that are fair to defendants, but it is 
nonetheless improper according to the correct interpretation of § 47.011. 
This Note argues that because the only accurate interpretation of § 47.011 
contravenes the policy it was designed to advance, the Florida legislature 
should amend Florida’s general venue statute to eliminate the accrual 
provision. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Section 47.011 of the Florida Statutes sets forth Florida’s general 
venue provisions.1 The purpose of venue is to ensure fairness and 
convenience for parties to litigation, especially the defendant. Venue 
achieves its purpose by placing limitations on the potential counties 
where the plaintiff can choose to bring suit. Accordingly, § 47.011 
provides that there are three counties where the plaintiff may bring an 
action: the county where a defendant resides, the county where property 
in litigation is located, and the county where the cause of action accrued. 
Unfortunately, an evaluation of the venue statute as applied reveals that 
the “accrual” provision of § 47.011 violates the purpose venue was 
                                                                                                                     
 1. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (2015). 
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intended to serve because it disadvantages the very defendants it was 
designed to protect.  
Although determining where a defendant resides or where property in 
litigation is located is fairly simple, determining where a cause of action 
accrued is somewhat more complicated and requires help from the 
judiciary. In actions for tort, courts have indicated that the cause of action 
accrues where the tort is complete. Completion is especially difficult to 
decipher when the essential elements of the tort take place in different 
locations. The Florida District Courts of Appeal (DCAs) developed the 
“effects test” and the “overt acts test” to establish where the completion 
of this type of tort occurs.2 An analysis of these two tests and their 
application demonstrates the inequity of the accrual provision of 
Florida’s venue statute.  
Despite the fact that the effects test is proper according to the correct 
interpretation of the accrual provision of the venue statute, it yields venue 
results that disadvantage defendants by forcing them to appear in court in 
counties to which they have no connection. This stands in direct 
opposition to the purpose that venue was meant to serve. In contrast, the 
overt acts test produces defendant-friendly results that advance the goals 
of venue. Although the overt acts test aligns with the policy behind venue, 
it is not proper according to the correct interpretation of the accrual 
provision of the venue statute. 
Part I of this Note discusses the origin and purpose of venue as well 
as Florida’s venue statute specifically. Part II evaluates the Florida 
DCAs’ interpretations of the accrual provision of § 47.011, particularly 
those decisions articulating the effects test and the overt acts test. Part III 
explains why both tests are flawed and further argues that because courts 
cannot accurately interpret § 47.011 without a test that contravenes the 
policy it was designed to advance, the Florida legislature should amend 
Florida’s general venue statute. Part IV proposes a remedy for the 
potential inequity—a venue statute that does not include an accrual 
provision. 
I.  VENUE: ITS ORIGIN, ITS PURPOSE, AND WHAT IT LOOKS LIKE IN 
FLORIDA 
Venue is an ancient concept rooted in English jurisprudence and is 
intended to ensure the convenience of parties to litigation, especially the 
defendant. Though statute prescribes modern venue at the federal level3 
                                                                                                                     
 2. See Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Langan Eng’g 
v. Harris Constructors, Inc., 743 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam). 
 3. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012) (“Venue generally”). For a discussion of venue at the federal 
level, see Jordan G. Lee, Note, Section 12 of the Clayton Act: When Can Worldwide Service of 
Process Allow Suit in Any District?, 56 FLA. L. REV. 673, 676–79 (2004). 
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and in most states,4 the origin of venue is rooted in common law. 
Understanding the origin and development of venue is an important part 
of understanding why venue is so crucial to protecting fairness for parties 
to litigation. This Part provides an introduction to venue and then 
discusses Florida’s venue statute in particular.  
A.  The Ancient Origin of Venue 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “venue” as “[t]he proper or a possible 
place for a lawsuit to proceed, usu[ally] because the place has some 
connection either with the events that gave rise to the lawsuit or with the 
plaintiff or defendant.”5 Unlike jurisdiction,6 venue is a statutory device 
designed to ensure optimum convenience for parties and witnesses as 
well as an efficient allocation of judicial resources.7 While jurisdiction is 
the power to adjudicate, venue dictates the place where courts may 
exercise judicial authority.8 In other words, “Venue is a procedural 
concept that denotes the locality or geographical area in which a court 
with jurisdiction may litigate a suit.”9 
To fully understand the purpose of venue, one must fully understand 
its origin. The modern version of venue is traceable to the development 
of the English judicial system.10 “Originally, venue referred to the county 
from which the court summoned jurors.”11 In their first capacity, jurors 
were responsible for actually questioning witnesses.12 Logically then, 
selecting jurors from the area where the dispute transpired or where the 
land subject to litigation is located ensured that the court performed this 
                                                                                                                     
 4. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 1975 § 6-3-2 (2014) (“Venue of actions -- Against individuals”); 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 (2014) (Illinois venue generally). 
 5. Venue, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 6. For an introduction to personal jurisdiction, see Dane Reed Ullian, Note, Retroactive 
Application of State Long-Arm Statutes, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1653, 1657–60 (2013). For a discussion 
of personal jurisdiction in Florida specifically, see Cole Barnett, Note, Is Injury a Tortious Act?: 
Interpreting Florida’s Long-Arm Statute, 66 FLA. L. REV. 2301, 2304 (2014).  
 7. Venue, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5 (citing JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.1, at 10 (2d ed. 1993)). Cf. Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash, 
Constitutional Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153, 1159–60 (2014) (“A foundational concept of 
American jurisprudence is the principle that it is unfair to allow litigants to be haled into far away 
tribunals when the litigants and the litigation have little or nothing to do with the location of such 
courts.”).  
 8. Venue, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, THE 
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 42, at 257 (5th ed. 1994)). 
 9. Craig A. Adoor & Joseph J. Simeone, The Law of Venue in Missouri, 32 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 639, 639 (1988).  
 10. Id. at 641.  
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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function properly.13 In theory, jurors from the county where the events 
giving rise to the litigation took place would be knowledgeable when 
addressing the conflict at hand. Familiarity with the area, its residents, 
and local customs would allow jurors to render the fairest judgment 
possible. Most importantly, selecting jurors local to the dispute protected 
defendants from unwarranted prejudice that might exist if the jury 
considered the defendant an outsider.14   
In modern American jurisdictions, statute controls venue.15 Scholars 
assert that the purpose of present-day venue is to ensure convenience for 
the defendant,16 preserving the goals of venue under English 
jurisprudence. The implementation of venue statutes in modern American 
jurisdictions is meant to achieve purposes that can be considered modern-
day parallels of the earlier defendant-friendly goals.  
B.  Florida’s Venue Statute 
In Florida, the county is the basic geographical territory for venue, and 
Florida has sixty-seven of them.17 Though jurisdiction is state-wide,18 for 
convenience of the parties, legislators found it proper to restrict a 
plaintiff’s choices in venue to only a few possibilities by enacting Florida 
Statute § 47.011.19 Florida’s general venue statute provides three prongs 
for determining proper venue.20 Those three prongs provide that the 
plaintiff can bring actions only in the county where the defendant resides, 
where the cause of action accrued, or where the property in litigation is 
located.21 Special venue provisions implicated by certain types of actions 
limit the general venue statute.22 When a special venue statute is more 
restrictive than the general venue statute, the special venue statute 
applies.23  
The limitations on venue provided by § 47.011 were designed “[t]o 
save the defendant from expense, inconvenience, harassment, annoyance, 
                                                                                                                     
 13. See id. 
 14. See FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE TRIAL § 7.2 (11th ed. 2013), 
CIVPRAC FL-CLE 7-1 (Westlaw). 
 15. Adoor & Simeone, supra note 9, at 642.  
 16. Id. 
 17. See FLORIDA BAR, supra note 14, § 7.1. 
 18. Id.  
 19. FLA. STAT. § 47.011 (2015). The scope of this Note is limited to situations in which 
there is a single defendant, though there are additional statutes that multiple defendant claims 
implicate. See, e.g., id. § 47.021 (“Actions against . . . defendants residing in different 
counties . . . .”). 
 20. Id. § 47.011. 
 21. Id.  
 22. See, e.g., id. § 63.102 (adoption); id. § 83.59(2) (landlord and tenant, residential). 
 23. FLORIDA BAR, supra note 14, § 7.10. 
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and, at times, local prejudice incident to defending a transitory action in 
a county of the plaintiff’s choice.”24 Additionally, these limitations were 
meant to benefit defendants by establishing a level of predictability 
regarding where a plaintiff might sue a defendant and requiring a 
connection with the potential county where a defendant might be forced 
to appear in court. In other words, the Florida legislature intended venue 
to be a device that protects the interests of defendants.  
II.  THE PROBLEM WITH FLORIDA STATUTE § 47.011: “WHERE THE 
CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED” 
Application of Florida’s venue statute produces relatively predictable 
and equitable results for defendants in many situations. These predictable 
situations include causes of action implicating the first prong25—the 
plaintiff brings suit in a county where the defendant resides—and the 
third prong26—the plaintiff brings suit where the property in litigation is 
located. Those clear-cut provisions indicate definitively where venue 
should lie. However, this is not the case for causes of action implicating 
the second prong of the venue statute. The second prong, referred to as 
the “accrual test,” states that the plaintiff shall bring an action “where the 
cause of action accrued.”27  
Causes of action that implicate the accrual test have been the source 
of much confusion.28 When the essential elements of a cause of action 
occur in one location, determining where the action accrued is very 
simple. Consider battery, which requires intent to contact another, actual 
offensive contact to another, and failure to consent to the contact.29 
Generally, those elements occur in the same location, and thus venue in 
actions for battery is simple to determine. When the essential elements of 
a cause of action occur in different places, however, the situation 
becomes more ambiguous. Consequently, when parties challenge venue 
because the essential elements of a cause of action do not take place in 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See FLORIDA BAR, supra note 14, § 7.2. 
 25. FLA. STAT. § 47.011. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id.  
 28. See, e.g., Moscowitz v. Oldham, 48 So. 3d 136 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that 
the client’s claims did not accrue in the county where the attorney directed the client to testify 
falsely); Fontana v. Hugo Int’l, 781 So. 2d 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the cause 
of action did not accrue where the plaintiff felt the effect, but where intentional interference took 
place); Wincor v. Cedars Healthcare Grp., Ltd., 695 So. 2d 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
that venue was proper in the county where injuries allegedly occurred); Weiner v. Prudential 
Mortg. Inv’rs, Inc., 557 So. 2d 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the cause of action 
accrued where the defendants were to have performed the promised services).   
 29. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 101 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2014). 
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the same county, Florida courts must interpret and apply the accrual test 
to determine where venue is proper.30 The failures of § 47.011 to 
accomplish its objectives become clear in the application of these 
interpretations.  
Florida’s Third DCA articulated the most prominent interpretation of 
the accrual test in 1986, when it decided Tucker v. Fianson.31 Tucker is 
instructive for three reasons. First, it provides an “answer” to where an 
action for tort accrues when the essential elements of the tort occur in 
multiple places.32 Second, Tucker provides the specific test for accrual in 
actions for legal malpractice.33 Third, Tucker serves as the basis for the 
specific test for accrual in actions for tortious interference as articulated 
by Florida’s Second DCA in Langan Engineering and Environmental 
Services, Inc. v. Harris Constructors, Inc.34 This Part discusses the 
development of Tucker and its progeny.  
A.  Tucker (Part 1): The Cause of Action Accrues Where the Tort Is 
Complete 
Probably the most cited language from Tucker v. Fianson comes from 
its answer to the question of where a cause of action accrues when a tort 
occurs across multiple counties.35 Defendant H. Allan Tucker was an 
attorney practicing and residing in Broward County.36 In the course of his 
practice, Tucker gave legal advice to a client regarding the condominium 
conversion of a building the client owned in Dade County.37 The client 
later alleged that the advice she received from Tucker in Broward County 
was negligent.38 She subsequently sued Tucker for legal malpractice in a 
Dade County court.39 Tucker moved to transfer venue to a court in 
Broward County, where he worked on the matter in question.40  
 
                                                                                                                     
 30. See, e.g., Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (addressing an 
action in which negligence took place in one county, but the plaintiff experienced damages in 
another county); Gaboury v. Flagler Hosp., Inc., 316 So. 2d 642 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) 
(addressing an action in which the defendants negligently treated the decedent in one county, but 
the decedent died in another).  
 31. 484 So. 2d at 1371. 
 32. Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1371. 
 33. Id. at 1372 (“[V]enue in the ensuing malpractice action was properly laid in the latter 
district where the economic damage had been done.”). 
 34. 743 So. 2d 1177, 1177–78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam).  
 35. Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1371. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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In its analysis, the court first addressed the question of where a cause 
of action accrues.41 Quoting the Supreme Court of Alaska in its Ebell v. 
Seapac Fisheries, Inc.42 decision, the Tucker court stated:  
 
[W]e adopt and apply the rule that, for venue purposes, a tort 
claim is deemed to have accrued “where the last event 
necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took 
place. . . . Thus, a claim for tort arose where the harmful 
force first took effect, or where the plaintiff suffered 
injury.”43 
  
The court then addressed the specific quandary of the “inter-county 
situation,”44 in which a “tortfeasor has committed a wrongful act in one 
place which has taken effect by causing damage in another.”45 The court 
held that in these situations, “the rule is well established that a cause of 
action accrues where the plaintiff suffers his or her injuries.”46 Tucker’s 
interpretation of this broad rule is the basis for its value as precedent 
because it explains the relationship between injury and accrual.  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “injury” as “[t]he violation of 
another’s legal right, for which the law provides a remedy.”47 Further, the 
Restatement (First) of Torts notes that if an injury is the result of a tortious 
act, then the person suffering the harm is entitled “to maintain an action 
of tort.”48 Because injury triggers the right to bring an action, the 
infliction of injury must also mean that the tort is complete.49 Therefore, 
the Tucker court indicated that the cause of action accrues in the place 
where the tort can be considered complete.50 This broad statement serves 
as a guide for the Tucker court and for future courts to follow because it 
provides the connection from injury to completion and from completion 
to accrual.  
                                                                                                                     
 41. Id.  
 42. 692 P.2d 956, 957 (Alaska 1984). 
 43. Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1371 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ebell, 692 P.2d at 957).   
 44. Id.  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1371 (quoting Pearson v. Wallace Aviation, Inc., 400 So. 2d 50, 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1981)).  
 47. Injury, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 48. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (1934). 
 49. It is a well-established rule that a tort is complete when damage or harm occurs. 
McIntyre v. McCloud, 334 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (citing Scott-Steven Dev. 
Corp. v. Gables by the Sea, Inc., 167 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (“The law furnishes a 
remedy only for such wrongful acts as result in injury or damage.”)); Duchaine v. Grosco Realty, 
Inc., 121 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (“[A] wrongful act does not constitute a good cause 
of action unless such wrongful act results in injury.”).  
 50. See Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1371. 
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B.  Tucker (Part 2): Actions for Professional Malpractice and the 
Effects Test 
After stating the broad definition of accrual, the Tucker court 
proceeded to apply that definition in its analysis of proper venue in legal 
malpractice actions specifically.51 The court affirmed the lower court’s 
ruling denying transfer of venue and noted that “the cause of action 
‘accrued’ under section 47.011, Florida Statutes (1985) in Dade County, 
where the defendant’s asserted negligence impacted upon the plaintiff’s 
economic interests.”52 
In his counterargument, Tucker asserted that Gaboury v. Flagler 
Hospital,53 a medical malpractice case, should control.54 In Gaboury, the 
plaintiffs brought action against the defendant physician for negligent 
treatment that resulted in the death of the plaintiffs’ daughter.55 The 
defendant treated the decedent at a hospital in St. Johns County, but after 
being released, the decedent later died in Orange County.56 Florida’s 
Fourth DCA affirmed the lower decision, holding that venue was proper 
where 
the act creating the right to bring an action occurred, and 
when a tort is complete in a particular county, the cause of 
action is deemed to have accrued there so as to fix venue, 
notwithstanding that the plaintiff may have suffered 
damages, and even his greatest damage, in another county.57 
Tucker used the Gaboury language that “a cause of action is said to 
arise at the place where the act creating the right to bring an action 
occurred”58 to argue that the cause of action accrued in his Broward 
County office because his allegedly negligent act occurred there.59 The 
Tucker court distinguished Gaboury and asserted that though the 
Gaboury court expressed the “broad doctrine in somewhat different 
terms, the precise determination was that the malpractice-wrongful death 
action accrued where the defendant negligently treated the decedent—
where, in other words, the negligence first took effect upon her body—
even though she died in another county.”60 The court continued by noting 
                                                                                                                     
 51. Id. at 1372. 
 52. Id. at 1371 (footnote omitted). 
 53. 316 So. 2d 642, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
 54. See Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1371 n.3.  
 55. Gaboury, 316 So. 2d at 643.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 644 (emphasis omitted). 
 58. Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1371 n.3 (quoting Gaboury, 316 So. 2d at 644). 
 59. See id.  
 60. Id. at 1371–72 (footnote omitted). 
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that “even under this formulation, it is clear that the critical ‘act’ is often 
not the wrongful conduct of the defendant, but its adverse impact upon 
the plaintiff.”61 
Thus, after Tucker, courts apply the accrual test in cases of 
professional malpractice by determining “where the last event necessary 
to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.”62 To reconcile this 
decision with Gaboury, which stated that a “cause of action is said to arise 
at the place where the act creating the right to bring an action 
occurred,”63 the Tucker court interprets “act” as an “adverse impact upon 
the plaintiff.”64 The court added that the plaintiff feels the injury where 
the harmful force first takes effect, even if the plaintiff sustains the 
greatest damage in another county.65 Thus, the standard that Florida 
courts rely upon in cases of professional malpractice is the “effects test”: 
the tort is complete, and therefore the cause of action accrues, where the 
plaintiff first experiences the harmful effects of the alleged negligence. 
C.  Langan: Tortious Interference and the Overt Acts Test 
In 1999, Florida’s Second DCA decided Langan Engineering and 
Environmental Services, Inc. v. Harris Constructors, Inc.66 In Langan, an 
action for tortious interference, the court cited Tucker67 but developed a 
venue test that is much different from the effects test.68  
Harris Constructors, Inc. (Harris), brought action against Langan 
Engineering (Langan).69 Harris alleged that Langan intentionally 
interfered with Harris’s business relationship with a third party,70 
resulting in the loss of a business project for Harris in Dade County.71 
Harris brought suit in Pinellas County where its office is located, even 
though the loss of the project occurred in Dade County.72  
The court began by citing the famous language from Tucker: “[F]or 
venue purposes, a tort claim is deemed to have accrued where the last 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Id. at 1372 n.3. 
 62. Id. at 1371 (quoting Ebell v. Seapac Fisheries, Inc., 692 P.2d 956, 957 (Alaska 1984)).   
 63. Gaboury, 316 So. 2d at 643.  
 64. Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1372 n.3. 
 65. Id. at 1372. 
 66. 743 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam).  
 67. Id. at 1177–78 (citing Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1371). 
 68. Id. (“For venue purposes, a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract or 
advantageous business relationship accrues in the county where overt acts constituting the 
interference occurred.”). 
 69. Id. at 1177. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id.  
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event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.”73 
The court then noted the lower court’s application of the effects test, 
which relied on language from Tucker “that a cause of action for legal 
malpractice ‘accrued’ for venue purposes ‘where the defendant’s asserted 
negligence impacted upon the plaintiff’s economic interests.’”74 The 
lower court reasoned that because Harris did not receive payment at its 
office in Pinellas County and resultantly felt the economic damage 
there,75 venue was proper in Pinellas County.76 The court, however, 
disagreed with the lower court’s interpretation77 and instead relied upon 
an alternate interpretation of the same Tucker language found in Williams 
v. Goldsmith.78 
In Williams, decided by Florida’s Third DCA, the defendant attorney 
was a partner employed by the plaintiff law firm in its office in Brevard 
County.79 The defendant left the plaintiff firm, taking many of the firm’s 
clients with him.80 The plaintiff law firm subsequently sued the defendant 
for tortious interference with contract in Dade County, where the plaintiff 
law firm had another office.81 The defendant moved to transfer venue to 
Brevard County, and the trial court denied the motion.82 The defendant 
subsequently appealed.83  
The court ruled that the alleged breach “occurred in [Brevard County] 
when appellant left the firm and wooed clients away from the firm.”84 
Resultantly, the court reversed the lower court’s order denying the 
appellant’s motion to transfer venue.85 The court quoted Tucker: “For 
venue purposes, a tort claim ‘is deemed to have accrued where the last 
event necessary to make the defendant liable for the tort took place.’ In 
other words, a tort accrues where the plaintiff first suffers injury.”86 The 
court then stated, “[W]e conclude that the injuries or damages first 
occurred in Brevard County. In the tortious interference with contract 
claim, the last event necessary to make appellant liable was luring the 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Id. at 1177–78 (alteration in original) (quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370, 
1371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).  
 74. Id. at 1178 (quoting Tucker, 484 So. at 1371).  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. 619 So. 2d 330, 332 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (per curiam) (quoting Tucker, 484 So.2d 
at 1371). 
 79. Id.   
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).  
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firm’s clients away in Brevard County. Hence, the injury was the loss of 
the clients.”87 In other words, the Williams court determined that injury 
occurred when the defendant lured the clients away.88 
When applying Tucker in light of the Williams decision, the Langan 
court disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of Tucker, which 
applied the effects test.89 The Langan court noted that the Third DCA in 
Williams specifically interpreted this same statement in Tucker to mean 
that a “tort accrues where the plaintiff first suffers injury.”90 The court 
concluded that “a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract 
or advantageous business relationship accrues in the county where overt 
acts constituting the interference occurred.”91  
An overt acts test for tortious interference actions results because the 
court ruled that venue is proper where the appellant did the luring. 92 The 
Langan court cited language from Tucker,93 affirming that the cause of 
action accrues when injury occurs, signaling that the tort is complete.94 
Though the lower court went a step further with Tucker and applied its 
effects test,95 the Langan court chose an interpretation of Tucker that 
separated the “injury” from the economic harm.96 This seems 
contradictory as both the Williams and Langan courts applied a Tucker 
analysis, implicating the effects test, but then articulated overt acts tests 
as conclusions.97 Despite the irony, the Langan court announced the 
standard for tortious interference: venue is proper where the overt acts 
constituting the interference and injury take place.98 
 
                                                                                                                     
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Langan Eng’g & Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Harris Constructors, 743 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam). 
 90. Id. (quoting Williams, 619 So. 2d at 332).  
 91. Id.  
 92. Though this case articulates the overt acts test and this test would otherwise apply to 
these facts, the court concluded by stating that “[i]n this case, we cannot determine where the 
injury occurred because the record does not reveal where Langan allegedly made the defamatory 
statements or where Clark maintains its offices. Therefore, the statute alternatively requires venue 
where Langan maintains its Florida offices, that is, Dade County.” Id. at 1178.  
 93. Langan, 743 So. 2d at 1177–78 (quoting Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1986)). 
 94. Id. at 1178. 
 95. See id. (“The trial court relied on the Third District’s statement in Tucker that a cause 
of action for legal malpractice ‘accrued’ for venue purposes ‘where the defendant’s asserted 
negligence impacted upon the plaintiff’s economic interests.’” (quoting Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 
1371)). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Langan, 743 So. 2d at 1178; Williams, 619 So. 2d at 332.  
 98. Langan, 743 So. 2d at 1178.  
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III.  WHY NEITHER THE EFFECTS TEST NOR THE OVERT ACTS 
TEST ARE PROPER, WHAT THAT SAYS ABOUT THE VENUE 
STATUTE, AND WHY IT MATTERS 
This Part argues that though the effects test articulated in Tucker is the 
correct interpretation of the accrual provision of Florida’s venue statute, 
it contravenes the policy of venue by disadvantaging the defendant. In 
contrast, though the overt acts test in Langan advances the policy of 
venue because it results in equitable venue for defendants, it is an 
incorrect interpretation of the accrual provision of Florida’s venue statute. 
This Part then explains that it is important to remedy this tension because 
the law as it stands may disadvantage thousands of Florida defendants.  
A.  Why Tucker Gets “Accrual” Right and Langan Gets “Accrual” 
Wrong 
Tucker articulates very clearly that a right of action accrues when a 
tort is complete. This is a relatively uncontested concept as Tucker 
specifically requires injury,99 and it is a well-known rule that a tort is 
complete upon injury. If one considers the definitions of malpractice and 
tortious interference in light of this articulation—that a tort is not 
complete until injury has occurred—and applies the tests Florida courts 
use to determine where those torts are “complete,” it becomes apparent 
that the overt acts test improperly fails to make a distinction between act 
and injury. This means that for torts where the act and injury are 
temporally and physically separated, the overt acts test may fail to find 
venue where the tort is complete, as Florida’s venue statute requires. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines the tort of malpractice as “[a]n 
instance of negligence or incompetence on the part of a professional.”100 
Additionally, “[t]o succeed in a malpractice claim, a plaintiff must also 
prove proximate cause and damages.”101 This blanket definition applies 
to both legal and medical malpractice; the only difference is in the type 
of duty required by the profession.102  
Based on the legal definition of malpractice, the effects test articulated 
in Tucker is the proper interpretation of the accrual provision of Florida’s 
venue statute. The definition of malpractice explicitly states that 
succeeding in a malpractice claim requires proof of injury.103 Thus, the 
tort cannot be complete, and therefore the cause of action for malpractice 
cannot accrue, until the plaintiff experiences the injury. This is exactly 
                                                                                                                     
 99. Langan, 743 So. 2d at 1178; Williams, 619 So. 2d at 332. 
 100. Malpractice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 101. Id.  
 102. See id. 
 103. See id. 
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what the effects test requires. The effects test states that the tort is 
complete, and therefore the cause of action accrues, where the plaintiff 
first experiences the harmful effects of the alleged negligence.104 
The definition of tortious interference is “[a]n intentional, damaging 
intrusion on another’s potential business relationship, such as the 
opportunity of obtaining customers or employment.”105 A second 
definition explicitly adds that the interference must cause “damage to the 
relationship between the contracting parties.”106  
Based on the legal definition of tortious interference, the overt acts 
test articulated in Langan is an improper interpretation of the accrual 
provision of Florida’s venue statute. The definition of tortious 
interference requires that the “intrusion on another’s potential business 
relationship” be “damaging.”107 Thus, not only must the intrusion on the 
potential business relationship be intentional, it must also cause injury. 
This is where the overt acts test fails.  
In articulating the overt acts test, the Langan court reasoned that “the 
last event necessary to make Langan liable was its interference with 
Harris’ business relationship with Clark in Dade County. The injury was 
the loss of the subcontract.”108 The problem with this line of reasoning is 
the way in which the Langan court meshes the loss of the subcontract (the 
injury) with the interference (the overt act).  
Again, according to the broad statement of Tucker, the cause of action 
accrues where the tort is complete, and venue is proper where the action 
accrues.109 By definition, the tort of intentional interference is not 
complete until there is injury.110 Because the overt acts test indicates that 
venue is proper where the overt acts constituting the interference took 
place, this test could be a proper interpretation of accrual only if the 
interference and injury were simultaneous and somehow joined together. 
In other words, if the act of interference is at all separable from the injury 
felt, the overt acts test is illogical because a tort cannot be complete 
without injury. In this instance, the act and the injury are indeed 
separable. 
                                                                                                                     
 104. See supra notes 62–65. 
 105. Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 106. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 107. Tortious Interference with Prospective Advantage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 
2014). 
 108. Langan Eng’g & Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Harris Constructors, 743 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam). 
 109. See Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 110. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 106. 
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The Langan court identifies the loss of the subcontract as the injury 
and implies that the injury occurred simultaneously with Langan’s overt 
acts of interference in Dade County.111 However, unless the third party 
was acting without any independence, a court must separate the damage 
from the act of interference. One can assume that the third party with 
whom Langan interfered had some autonomy in deciding to abandon the 
subcontract with Harris. Even though Langan prompted the third party  to 
abandon the subcontract, at some point the third party had to affirmatively 
choose to do so. Until the third party acted upon Langan’s promptings, 
injury was hypothetical, and therefore the tort was incomplete. In theory, 
the third party could have ignored Langan’s promptings and continued in 
the contract with Harris. In that scenario, despite Langan’s alleged 
interference, there would be no injury. Tortious interference is complete 
only when it has resulted in concrete injury.112 Since the overt acts test 
can be satisfied prior to the actualization of injury, it is an improper 
interpretation of accrual.  
B.  Why Langan Gets Policy Right and Tucker Gets Policy Wrong 
Although Tucker and its effects test present the correct interpretation 
of the accrual provision of Florida’s venue statute, implementation of the 
effects test can disadvantage defendants. In contrast, although the overt 
acts test is an incorrect interpretation of the accrual provision, it produces 
venue results that ensure fairness and convenience for defendants.  
To exemplify this disadvantage, consider two defendants this Note 
discussed above, H. Allan Tucker and Langan Engineering. Though the 
same case law controlled venue in both of these actions, Tucker was the 
only defendant forced to defend himself in a county where he neither 
resided, practiced, nor acted in regard to the matter in question.113 This is 
an example of the way in which attorneys are disadvantaged because of 
the nature of legal malpractice when a court applies the effects test. 
Further, following the effects test to its logical conclusion, an attorney 
working in her office in South Florida could give professional advice to 
a client in her office that the client later alleges was negligent. The client 
might have acted on said advice in North Florida without the South 
Florida attorney’s knowledge of the client’s intention to do so, and thus 
any potential injury to the client may have occurred there. Applying the 
                                                                                                                     
 111. See Langan, 743 So. 2d at 1178. 
 112. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 106. 
 113. Compare Tucker, 484 So. 2d at 1371–72 (ruling that even though Tucker practiced, 
resided, and “shot his arrow into the air of Broward County,” venue was proper in Dade County), 
with Langan, 743 So. 2d at 1178 (holding that venue in Dade County where Langan maintained 
its Florida office was proper). 
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effects test, the cause of action would accrue in North Florida where the 
client acted upon the advice, not in South Florida where the attorney acted 
by giving the allegedly negligent advice. In this case, the effects test 
would force the attorney to defend herself in a court hundreds of miles 
away in a county where she never expected to appear, putting her at a 
severe disadvantage.114  
Florida’s large size further exaggerates this problem, as defending 
across state could mean traveling significantly extended distances. If a 
plaintiff showed, for example, that he acted in Panama City upon an 
attorney’s negligent advice given in Miami and thus he felt the effects in 
Panama City, the effects test would hale the attorney into court in a 
county roughly 580 miles away from where he practices.115 This might 
seem far-fetched, but this is just a slight modification of the facts found 
in Tucker. It is clear that the effects test does not advance the purposes 
that the Florida legislature intended the venue statute to achieve. 
C.  The Importance of Solving the Venue Problem: Defendants Are at 
Risk 
Though there are other scenarios in which the accrual provision of the 
venue statute creates a disadvantage for defendants, this Section frames 
the urgency of the problem with the plight of attorneys who could be 
defendants in legal malpractice actions. The recent climb in the number 
of legal malpractice claims across the country confirms the necessity of 
a solution to the venue disadvantage. Every four years, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) publishes a study detailing trends in legal malpractice 
from data provided by malpractice-insurance carriers.116 Though it is 
“virtually impossible”117 to gather “across-the-profession data on legal 
malpractice errors”118 because multiple legal professional liability 
insurers exist in each state and because many U.S. attorneys do not have 
malpractice insurance,119 the numbers that the ABA committee has been 
                                                                                                                     
 114. Though venue is in some ways meant to protect the plaintiff’s interests as well, since 
the plaintiff would have sought out the attorney’s counsel in the county where the attorney was 
practicing, the plaintiff would not be surprised to face an action in that county.  
 115. Driving Directions from Panama City, FL to Miami, FL, GOOGLEMAPS, 
https://www.google.com/maps (follow “Get Directions” hyperlink; then search “A” for “Panama 
City, FL,” and search “B” for “Miami, FL”; then follow “Get Directions” hyperlink). 
 116. Profile of Legal Malpractice Claims, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://shop.americanbar.org/ 
eBus/Store/ProductDetails.aspx?productId=213575 (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).  
 117. Daniel E. Pinnington, ARE YOU AT RISK?: The Biggest Malpractice Claim Risks and 
How to Avoid Them, 36 LAW PRAC. 29, July/August 2010, at 29, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/law_practice_home/law_practice_archive/lpm_magazine_articles_v36_is4_pg29.ht
ml. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. 
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able to gather are still staggering. In the most recent study published in 
2011, there were 53,000 legal malpractice claims reported.120 That is the 
highest number of claims reported in any study thus far.121 Further, 
“20.3% of reported malpractice claims during the study period involved 
matters in both residential and commercial real estate transactions.”122 
Considering that the facts of Tucker center upon a real estate 
transaction,123 one can assume that a great provision of at least twenty 
percent of malpractice actions have the potential to put a defending 
attorney at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to the determination of 
venue.  
In light of the upward trend in the number of malpractice claims 
filed,124 one can infer that the next study the ABA publishes on this issue 
will show even higher numbers and therefore increased risk of serious 
disadvantage under the current test used for venue determination in legal 
malpractice cases.  
IV.  A PROPOSED SOLUTION: ELIMINATING THE ACCRUAL PROVISION OF 
THE VENUE STATUTE 
Many other states have, like Florida, adopted a venue statute with an 
accrual prong.125 Broad use, however, does not equate to propriety. There 
are many long-standing practices that are not beneficial but are 
nevertheless preserved as a matter of convenience, and applying the 
effects test to determine venue in professional malpractice cases is one of 
them. The resulting inequity in Florida is indicative of a broader need for 
change in states with similar provisions nationwide.  
In fact, several states that employed venue statutes with accrual 
provisions or other similar language have since revised their venue 
statutes in the interest of fairness.126 These states include Alabama, 
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, South Carolina, and West 
Virginia.127  
                                                                                                                     
 120. Todd C. Scott, Recent ABA Study Suggests Emerging New Trends in Legal Malpractice, 
28 MINN. LAW. MUTUAL, Oct. 2012, https://www.mlmins.com/Library/The%20View%20 
Newsletter%20October%202012.pdf. 
 121. Pinnington, supra note 117. 
 122. Scott, supra note 120. 
 123. See Tucker v. Fianson, 484 So. 2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). 
 124. Scott, supra note 120. 
 125. Though these statutes do not mention “accrual,” courts interpret their tests based on 
“where the cause of action arose” similarly to accrual. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101 
(2014) (Illinois venue generally); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002 (West 2013) 
(“Venue: General Rule”); W. VA. CODE § 56-1-1 (2007) (“Venue generally”).  
 126. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3 (2004) (Venue generally). 
 127. Forum and Venue Reform, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, 
http://www.atra.org/issues/forum-and-venue-reform (last visited Oct. 24, 2015). 
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In 1999, Alabama amended its venue statute.128 Venue is now proper 
in the county where the defendant resides or where the property in 
litigation is located, with a few other established exceptions.129 In the 
committee comments on the new statute’s adoption, the committee 
provides, “The law provision seems preferable because in tort cases the 
county where the claim arose will frequently be most convenient for 
witnesses, for a view by the jurors, etc.”130  
Mississippi has gone to great lengths to ensure that its court system 
treats all parties to litigation fairly.131 In fact, in 2004, Mississippi 
instituted new venue provisions132 establishing that venue is proper where 
the defendant resides or where a substantial act, omission, or event 
occurred.133 These tests produce venue outcomes that are fair and 
predictable for all defendants. Mississippi even went as far as to offer a 
provision designed to protect defendants in medical malpractice actions 
potentially disadvantaged by an effects test rule.134 The “substantial act 
or omission test”135 would produce the type of equitable result that 
Langan’s overt acts test produces, only in accordance with the general 
venue provision.136 According to the Mississippi Development Authority, 
the new provisions ensure “fairness in the courtroom for everyone.”137 
In light of the measures taken by other states to ensure their venue 
statutes were protecting the interests they were intended to, a solution 
exists. Florida should remove the accrual provision of the venue statute 
altogether, leaving a venue statute similar to that of Louisiana.138 Though 
several states have adopted statutes similar to Louisiana’s, this Section 
focuses specifically on Louisiana’s statute because Louisiana courts have 
interpreted it, whereas other states with similar statutes have not yet had 
their courts interpret them. 
The accrual prong of Florida’s venue statute has caused confusion as 
evidenced by the cases mentioned above, all centering upon its 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See id. 
 129. ALA. CODE § 6-3-2b (2013) (“Venue of actions -- Against individuals.”). 
 130. Committee Comment on Adoption, ALA. R. CIV. P. 82 (2013). 
 131. Tort Reform Act of 2004, MISS. DEV. AUTH., http://www.mississippi.org/mda-library-
resources/resources/tort-reform-act-of-2004.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2016) (known as “House 
Bill 13”). 
 132. See id.  
 133. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-11-3 (2004). 
 134. Id. § 11-11-3(3) (“[A]ny action against a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, nurse, 
nurse-practitioner . . . including any legal entity which may be liable for their acts or omissions, 
for malpractice, negligence, error, omission, mistake . . . shall be brought only in the county in 
which the alleged act or omission occurred.”).  
 135. Id. § 11-11-3(1). 
 136. See id. § 11-11-3. 
 137. See Tort Reform Act of 2004, supra note 131. 
 138. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 42 (2012). 
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ambiguity. One solution to this ambiguity and potential inequity is to 
remove the accrual prong of the venue statute altogether. The Louisiana 
legislature has adopted this approach, resulting in a venue statute that 
provides both predictability and uniformity in venue determinations.  
The Louisiana venue statute139 contains seven provisions applicable 
to determining venue based solely on the type of party named as the 
defendant in the action.140 The provisions prescribe venue for actions 
brought against individuals, domestic corporations and partnerships, 
foreign corporations licensed and non-licensed in Louisiana, non-
residents, and foreign insurers based upon either where the defendant 
resides or operates its business.141 For example, “The general rules of 
venue are that an action against . . . [a]n individual who is domiciled in 
the state shall be brought in the parish of his domicile; or if he resides but 
is not domiciled in the state, in the parish of his residence.”142 Unlike 
Florida, the Louisiana provision does not take into account where the 
cause of action accrued; rather, it names one specific venue for causes of 
action dependent upon the geographical location of the defendant.  
Recognizing that the general provision might not be informative in 
some situations, the Louisiana legislature created a number of exceptions 
to the provision, including exceptions for actions involving immovable 
property,143 actions on contract,144 and actions involving joint or solidary 
obligors.145 Overall and understandably so, employing a general 
provision that concretely prescribes venue with a certain number of 
named exceptions effectively streamlines venue determination. This is 
different from a statute such as Florida’s, which includes a test that courts 
must interpret according to the facts on a case-by-case basis.  
Regarding actions involving legal malpractice specifically, under the 
Louisiana statute, the determination of venue is both straightforward and 
predictable. For example, in Frisard v. State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Co.,146 the court affirmed the defendant’s exception of venue and 
transferred the case to St. Tammany Parish,147 where the defendant 
resided and practiced law.148 The plaintiff, Dan Frisard, brought an action 
                                                                                                                     
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. art. 42(1). 
 143. Id. art. 80. 
 144. Id. art. 76.1. 
 145. Id. art. 73. 
 146. 837 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App. 2003). 
 147. Instead of counties, Louisiana is divided into parishes.  
 148. Frisard, 837 So. 2d at 708. 
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for malpractice against attorney William Lozes.149 Frisard alleged that the 
attorney’s actions in failing to properly defend him constituted 
malpractice.150 Frisard filed his lawsuit in the 24th Judicial District Court 
in Jefferson Parish; subsequently, Lozes filed an exception of improper 
venue and requested transfer to St. Tammany Parish.151  
The trial court granted the request, relying on Louisiana’s general 
rules of venue, which state that a plaintiff must bring suit against an 
individual domiciled in the state of Louisiana in the parish of the 
individual’s domicile.152 The lower court found that Lozes was domiciled 
in St. Tammany Parish, and thus Frisard should have brought suit there.153 
The court affirmed the judgment entered below.154 
The appellate court stated, “The Louisiana Supreme Court has held 
that in a malpractice action, venue is proper in the parish where the 
wrongful conduct occurred.”155 Though Frisard argued that the wrongful 
conduct in this case occurred in Jefferson Parish where Lozes failed to 
file pleadings, the court determined that Lozes was a resident of St. 
Tammany Parish and his law office and entire practice are located in St. 
Tammany Parish.156  
The court reasoned that “although plaintiff . . . asserts that defendants 
failed to file pleadings on his behalf in the Jefferson Parish suit, this 
allegation alone fails to establish that defendants’ alleged wrongful 
conduct occurred in Jefferson Parish.”157 The opinion further states, 
“[A]ny alleged wrongful conduct on the part of defendants occurred in 
St. Tammany Parish where their law offices were located. In this case, 
the acts or failure to act on the part of defendants occurred in their law 
offices where they handled the defense of the lawsuits filed against Mr. 
Frisard.”158 
A venue provision such as Louisiana’s produces uniform and 
predictable results, which becomes apparent in reviewing Louisiana’s 
                                                                                                                     
 149. Porteous, Hainkel, Johnson and Sarpy Law Firm employed attorney Lozes, and State 
Farm appointed Lozes as Frisard’s attorney as part of Frisard’s liability insurance. Id. at 707. This 
action was in addition to Frisard’s charges against State Farm and the entire law firm. Id.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 707–08. 
 153. Id. at 708.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. (citing Chambers v. LeBlanc, 598 So. 2d 337, 337–38 (La. 1992)). The court cited 
this language from the Louisiana state court despite Frisard’s argument that the malpractice fell 
under Louisiana’s Code of Civil Procedure, article 74. Id. Article 74 is an exception to the general 
venue statute, which states that “[a]n action for the recovery of damages for an offense or quasi 
offense may be brought in the parish where the wrongful conduct occurred, or in the parish where 
the damages were sustained.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 74 (2012). 
 156. Frisard, 837 So. 2d at 708. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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venue case law. Whereas applying a fact-specific accrual test to every 
action sounding in tort can produce venue results that might vary from 
case to case, establishing one general venue provision for all types of 
cases with only certain exceptions carved out in advance produces 
outcomes that are both equitable and highly predictable. Louisiana’s 
venue statute produces outcomes that achieve the purposes the Louisiana 
legislature intended it to further.  
CONCLUSION 
Florida Statute § 47.011 is intended to ensure convenience and 
fairness for parties to litigation, especially the defendant. Because 
Florida’s current venue statute is an impediment to fair trial for some 
defendants, resolving this issue is critical.  Since courts cannot properly 
interpret the accrual provision of § 47.011 without contravening the 
policy behind venue, the Florida legislature should follow other states 
that have abandoned the accrual language159 and that adopted venue 
statutes that better serve the interests venue was intended to promote. The 
Florida legislature should amend § 47.011 of the Florida Statutes to 
exclude the accrual provision.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 159. Or “arising under” language.  
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